A significant challenge is to explain how people cooperate for public goods. The problem is more difficult for people who hardly know one another, their public good is unclear at the outset and its timing and costs are uncertain. However, history shows that even under adverse conditions, people can cooperate. As a prelude to cooperation, people can establish (or reinforce) social ties and increase their solidarity through interaction rituals. Consequently, individuals' commitments and psychological states may synchronize, so that they can depend on like-minded people rather than on a rational grasp of their situation, which is not feasible under difficult circumstances. A necessary condition is that the network that is formed (or used) during the ritual compensates for participants' initial differences. A model shows exactly what network patterns are optimal, and it predicts that at a critical level of solidarity, a heterogeneous majority homogenizes in a sudden phase transition. This synchronization yields a boost of emotional energy for a burst of collective action. * Thank you to
Paradoxically, people can act collectively-and effectively-while being tempted to defect and exploit the results of other people's efforts (Simpson and Willer 2015; Kollock 1998; Oliver 1993) . In contrast to current models and lab experiments of cooperation, many of these situations are characterized by multi-fold uncertainty. Examples are defending settlements, mass protests, revolts against dictatorial regimes and hunting large animals by ancestral groups with light armament. In these situations, contributing may be retaliated by the opponent (or prey); therefore, the costs can be unexpectedly high and the participants may be paralysed by fear (Collins 2008) . Moreover, the public good itself may be unclear or have different meanings for different people (Baldassarri 2009 ), for example "democracy," and may be realized in the future, if at all, which implies that its future value is discounted in the present (Levin 2012 ). However, history shows that even under adverse conditions, people often manage to cooperate (Tarrow 1994; McAdam 1986; Gintis et al. 2015) . My research question is: how?
In situations where most people are strangers to one another, for example East European protesters against communism in 1989, they have a cold start problem. These people must determine the public good they actually want and how to achieve it, and they must become committed to it. High average commitments do not predict cooperation, though (Swann et al. 2012) ; the lowly committed can free ride on the highly committed, who in turn may distrust the lowly committed and abstain from contributing. In experiments, cooperation was higher among people who were equally committed (Kurzban et al. 2001 ). However, homogeneous commitments are often also insufficient (Olson 1965) , because people may still may have conflicting ideas concerning what to do and by whom. Thus, people must also synchronize their framing of the situation (Steinberg 1998) , their definition of the public good, and their plans of action; in short, they must synchronize their cognitiveemotional states. Finally, their synchronization of their commitments and of their psychological states must become common knowledge. Then, people have a shared intentionality, 1 which means that they know that other people feel, think and want the same as they do; on this basis they can start to cooperate as a single-minded family .
To achieve a shared intentionality, people must interact first. Established groups already have a network of relatively stable ties, but under multi-fold uncertainty, typical solutions to dilemma's of cooperation 2 may not suffice; then, people need additional means to get over the hump. Although their network makes it easier for them, by providing knowledge regarding one another and sustaining norms that strangers lack, established groups have in common with strangers that they must reach a shared intentionality, too. The research question can be narrowed down accordingly: How can collections of strangers and established groups develop a shared intentionality under adverse conditions?
Approach
As an answer to this question, I propose certain interaction rituals (Collins 2004) . Some examples are marching, singing and noise making at street demonstrations before a physical confrontation with the incumbent power (McPhail and Wohlstein 1986) and dance and religious ceremonies before a hunt or fight (Durkheim 1912; McNeill 1995) . These rituals can (in principle) be performed by strangers with some shared cultural background, who thereby create fledgling ties and a preliminary group boundary. Obviously, existing groups with a network have a larger variety of rituals to choose from. 3 Although interaction rituals cost time and effort, many can be executed at relatively low costs compared with the contributions that pertain to the public good, which are required anyway, without exogenous resources. Therefore many (newly-forming) groups can self-organize their cooperation. In some cases, an interaction ritual can already accomplish a collective good without additional contributions, for example a mass demonstration that convinces a government to change a law before riots begin. Although this paper focuses on the difficult cases that require substantial contributions, the lowcontribution cases can be largely explained in terms of recruitment into those groups, which has been studied by other researchers (González-Bailón et al. 2011; McAdam 1986; Gould 1991) .
To sharpen interaction ritual theory, I apply a well-studied synchronization model (Nadis 2003; Arenas et al. 2008 ) in a new way. Going beyond previous explanations and models that acknowledged the importance of networks, the synchronization model predicts exactly which patterns of social ties yield cooperation more easily, i.e. at a lower effort and, therefore, more quickly. 4 The network measure that is used is called algebraic connectivity (Fiedler 1973) . It is high when the network appears roundish without large holes in it, whereas it is low for networks with skinny parts, large distances or highly unequal distributions of the number of ties (relatively high maximum degree). By focusing on both network topology and shared intentionality, it becomes clear why interaction rituals are widely used to encourage cooperation and why some rituals-with low connectivity-fail. Algebraic connectivity is also closely related to social cohesion. Because information transmission through a network can be unreliable, cohesion was defined considering a multiplicity of independent connections (Moody and White 2003) , which happens to be mathematically implied by algebraic connectivity.
In many studies on cooperation, network topology is ignored or abstracted away from, and in some experiments-without communication-topology turned out to be unimportant. In those experiments, subjects could respond to other people's actions in previous rounds by either cooperating or defecting with everybody in their neighborhood (Gracia-Lázaro et al. 2012) or group (Suri and Watts 2011) . For topology to have an effect, however, people must be able to reciprocate the (in)actions of specific people (Panchanathan and Boyd 2004; Cuesta et al. 2015) ; otherwise, free riding is inconsequential for some people whereas others are punished for cooperating. This coarsegrained behavior in the experiments is an artefact of their design, and is clearly inefficient, whereas for fine grained reciprocity with specific individuals, and for the diffusion of reputations, topology is important.
By far the best-known theory concerning the onset of cooperation among (mostly) strangers explains that a critical mass of initiators can win over the rest (Granovetter 1978; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Macy 1991) . Below the critical mass, contributions typically have little impact on the production of the public good, and the question is how a critical mass can be formed. Somehow, there should be zealous, heroic, resourceful, well-organized or like-minded people in the first place. The synchronization model can solve the start-up problem by explaining how ordinary people with heterogeneous ideas and commitments can reach a shared intentionality and form a critical mass. It does so without strong assumptions regarding individual rationality. Critical mass theory, in contrast, rests on the assumption that people know the marginal effect of their contributions (Centola 2013; Marwell and Oliver 1993 ). This knowledge people may have in straightforward or highly repetitive situations, but under multi-fold uncertainty, people have no more than a hunch regarding their benefits and costs, and are sometimes fatally inaccurate. After all, people's cognitive limitations are an important reason for them to connect to others and to join interaction rituals in the first place.
In the next section, Collins' interaction ritual theory will be interpreted concerning its explanatory power for collective action, complemented with findings by numerous others. Subsequently, the synchronization model will be applied, which predicts, with algebraic connectivity, that cooperation occurs in a burst, not gradually or sequentially. This tipping point is a second result, which is consistent with observations of, for example, collective protests, which are bursty indeed (Tarrow 1994) . The model increases the explanatory power of interaction ritual theory also in a third way. Whereas Collins took a mutual focus of attention and a shared mood as "ingredients" (2004: 48), the model explains this homogeneity as an outcome from initial heterogeneity, which is consistent with McNeill's (McNeill 1995) empirical findings. After these predictions, simpler situations will be discussed, with uncertainty only concerning the number of contributors, not regarding the goods' timing, benefits and costs. Then, the onset of cooperation can be explained without rituals and synchronization, and a certain level of consensus will suffice. However, I will argue that algebraic connectivity is also important in these cases, and I will explicate topology's relation with social cohesion. Collective action, social cohesion, consensus building and information transmission thus turn out to be interrelated by the algebraic connectivity of the participants' network, which deepens our understanding of the relational foundations of social life. Finally, dynamic networks will be discussed.
Interaction rituals
To start out, members of a (newly-forming) group involved with a (possibly ill-defined) public good can perform certain interaction rituals (Collins 2004; Durkheim 1912) . Many rituals involve rhythmic entrainment, which increases perceptions of similarity ). Entrainment can be synchronous, evenly paced, anti-phase (in partner dance), or sequential (in a stadium wave) and can vary strongly in frequency (Knottnerus 2010) . In experiments that compare treatments with asynchronous and synchronous movements, contributions to public goods were significantly higher in the latter Fischer et al. 2013; Wiltermuth and Heath 2009) .
Interaction rituals increase solidarity (Whitehouse and Lanman 2014; Collins 2004; Durkheim 1912) , 5 which denotes the bonding strength of individuals to an entire group, which is distinguished from social cohesion that describes the pattern of ties among individual group members (White and Harary 2001; Moody and White 2003) . Rituals may also increase the strengths of ties, which is discussed later. Moral justification, religion or sacred values Atran and Ginges 2012) can enhance emotional intensity that further increases solidarity (Collins 2004; McNeill 1995) . For us it is important that when the uncertainties are higher and more numerous, stronger group-directed emotions should be aroused for solidarity to increase. A competitive group (Sherif et al. 1961) or an enemy (Collins 2008; Choi and Bowles 2007) can provide an extra push. Rare but emotionally intense rituals, for example, initiation in the French Foreign Legion, have a stronger effect on solidarity than frequently occurring low arousal rituals such as prayers (Atkinson and Whitehouse 2011; Jones 2013) .
For the participants to learn about one another's commitments, and to sense one another's body language and emotions, they should interact in physical co-presence (Collins 2004; Sebanz et al. 2006) , which is a key feature of interaction rituals. 6 These co-resent interactions make possible for commitments to become (local) common knowledge (Chwe 2001) . Interactions can be initiated for the first time or can be based on an existing network. Either way, interactions are modelled as symmetric ties a ij = a ji = 1 (and absent ties a ij = 0) among the participants who are indexed i and j, and later generalized to (possibly asymmetric) weighted ties a ij ≥ 0.
Under uncertainty, the participants will have changing emotions and thoughts concerning their collective action(s). Because our question regards the synchronization of the group, not the complexities of the participants' psychologies, focal actor's psychological state is characterized by one variable θ i (t) that varies over time. If the difference between focal actor's state θ i (t) and her social contact's state θ j (t) is stable, their synchronization is higher when the difference is smaller (Jadbabaie et al. 2004 ). Both fluctuating and large differences indicate asynchronous states. Through empathy, a focal actor's state may change by the states of her social contacts (Collins 2004: 54, 5 Solidarity is also called identification (Klandermans 2002; Kelly 1993) or loyalty (Simon 1990; Diamond 2004) . Currently it is not known if solidarity correlates with the number or the proportion of someone's ties in a given group, and how ties' effect is moderated by embeddedness, so I simply stick to the empirical regularity that solidarity increases by participating in a group ritual. Solidarity is indicated by an individual's expressions of adherence to a group's goals or values, or by the extent to which (s)he is affected by the group's concerns. A willingness to do something for the group's members, in contrast, conflates solidarity with cooperation. 6 The question whether the co-presence's effect can be achieved through audiovisual media, which was raised by Collins (2004, p.54 ), goes beyond this paper. 78), and a more different contact state has a larger influence on this change. However, if someone is simultaneously influenced by multiple people, the influence of an individual contact will relatively weaken amidst a larger number of them. Therefore, the magnitude of a given contact's influence is divided by the focal actor's degree, just like in models of social influence and network autocorrelation (Friedkin and Johnsen 2011; Leenders 2002) . The effect size of social contacts' states is also moderated by focal actor's solidarity: if she identifies strongly with the entire group, her contacts in this group will have a relatively strong influence on her, whereas if her solidarity is low, she is psychologically less affected by the emotions and concerns of these contacts. Finally, a focal actor's psychological state changes in response to her own commitment ω i .
Usually, people will have different commitments 7 to different goods and goals of their group, which possibly but not necessarily correlate with their solidarity. For a given public good, the participants' commitments are modelled as a symmetric single-peaked distribution g(ω) that is mean-centred at 0, for example a Gaussian.
Synchronization
To analyze the effect of interaction rituals, I use Kuramoto's model (Kuramoto 1975; Strogatz 2000) . This model has already solved numerous problems in physics, biology, engineering, complex networks and computer science (Arenas et al. 2008; Dörfler and Bullo 2014; Kocarev 2013) , thereby establishing cross-disciplinary parsimony. In Kuramoto's original model, ω is a frequency and θ is a phase. Obviously, people are no oscillators, but we can obtain tractability through these simplifications. Reading the model's "coupling strength" K as solidarity is straightforward. In the model, time indices are dropped, d i denotes degree, andθ i is used as a shorthand for psychological change, dθ i (t)/dt. Using the variables that were just discussed, the model for N participants is:
In a moment, there will be variation of solidarity across individuals, K i , but in the simplest model version everybody has the same solidarity. The degree to which all participants are synchronized is indicated by an order parameter, 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. 8 Analytic solutions were derived for complete graphs, wherein every node is connected to every other node and N is very large. When solidarity increases, psychological states remain incoherent (r = 0), and solidarity appears to have no effect at all. At a critical threshold K c , however, there is a sudden transition toward stable, although not perfect (r < 1), synchronization of a large majority, and Eq.1 implies that commitments synchronize at the same moment. This two-fold phase transition to synchronization becomes even more "explosive" when considering that solidarity varies across individuals and is correlated with commitments (Hu et al. 2014) . 9 This phase transition has also been found for many sparse graphs with (much) smaller N (Arenas et al. 2008) . Except for very small groups, social networks are sparse, clustered into subgroups and have skewed degree distributions and short network distances (Apicella et al. 2012; Blondel et al. 2015) . Solidarity is limited by the nervous system, and can not reach arbitrarily high values. For a social network to synchronize at a feasible level of solidarity, its connectivity must compensate for the differences among commitments or else the order parameter jitters and synchronization is not achieved (Dörfler and Bullo 2014) . The stability of the order parameter is studied through the algebraic connectivity of the graph, which is denoted λ 2 , and is the second smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian. 10 A mathematical analysis of Eq.1 (Jadbabaie et al. 2004; Dörfler and Bullo 2014) shows that increasing a network's algebraic connectivity yields synchronization at a lower solidarity, with less costly rituals and more quickly. Density, average distance (Arenas et al. 2008 ) and degree distribution (Atay et al. 2006 ) do not generally predict this outcome.
To illustrate, Fig.1 compares a wheel (λ 2 = 2) to a bow tie (λ 2 = 1) topology, which are equal in size (7), density (0.57), average distance (1.43), degree distribution, degree centralization (0.6), and coreness (both are 3- cores 11 ). In large graphs, r = 0 below the critical threshold, whereas in our small graphs, r jitters with time (not shown) but that means that there is no synchronization by definition. Then, at a very small increment of solidarity that crosses the threshold, synchronization sets in and reaches a high value right away. For each of 20 draws of initial values (from a uniform distribution between −π and π) and commitments (from a Gaussian with σ = 2), the wheel (triangles) synchronizes at a lower solidarity than the bow tie (dots). The reason for the large variation of critical thresholds across these 20 draws is that synchronization in small graphs is very sensitive to small differences between initial values. Sociologically, this means that individuals and their differences do matter for outcomes at the group level. Algebraic connectivity can increase when the strength of ties increases, as a consequence of the interaction ritual, but people have limited capability to have strong ties, at the expense of other ties (Miritello et al. 2013 ). This social homeostasis ) also constrains the total number of ties that individuals can maintain (Saramäki et al. 2014) . The members can connect with strong ties (a ij 1) only if their group is small and for a limited time. In Fig.1 , the bow tie's connectivity would double by a two-fold increase of all tie strengths, whereas relaying two ties to create a wheel has the same effect. Relaying a given number of ties (and keeping their strengths as they are) is clearly more efficient. Alternatively, algebraic connectivity can increase by increasing group size, but because of homophily (McPherson et al. 2001 ) and homeostatis, large groups always cluster into subgroups. Therefore, there is a-still unknown-maximum connectivity. 12 This implies that the potential for groups to synchronize has a sweet spot somewhere in between small and large group size, and co-depends on the network topology.
Well-connected subgroups s synchronize at K s < K c (Arenas et al. 2006 ). If the network is formed on the basis of homophily of commitments, such that the variation of commitments among subgroup members is relatively small (indicated by the Euclidean norm), the consequences for the critical thresholds of the subgroups and the entire group are in opposite directions: homophilous subgroups synchronize at a lower solidarity (Jadbabaie et al. 2004; Dörfler and Bullo 2014) whereas the entire group synchronizes at a 11 In a k-core, everybody has at least k ties with others who in turn have at least k ties (Seidman 1983) . 12 The long run maximum algebraic connectivity is lower than the short run maximum, because dense networks with low clustering, or modularity, cost a great deal of energy to maintain (Garlaschelli et al. 2013 ) and adapt very slowly to a changing environment (Kashtan et al. 2009 ), thereby jeopardizing group continuity. Interestingly, maximum information diffusion is not at maximum connectivity but at a much lower value (Nematzadeh et al. 2014). higher solidarity (Freitas et al. 2015) . Although the latter challenges overall synchronization, it may happen that remaining (asynchronous) participants are an audience who supports the synchronous subgroups, which often occurs when small groups of street protesters confront the police (Collins 2008) . Alternatively, the audience may be won over and join the action if the initiators form a critical mass. These audience members do not need to know the marginal effect of their contributions; following initiators with whom they identify is sufficient (Boyd and Richerson 1985) .
If an interaction ritual is in full swing and participant's algebraic connectivity is sufficient, the model predicts that their psychological states and commitments, respectively, fuse into one, which is necessary for cooperation under multi-fold uncertainty. The simultaneity of their synchronization will yield a stronger boost of emotional energy, or collective effervescence (Durkheim 1912) , than if it were gradual or sequential. 13 If, in contrast, the ritual is ill-performed or connectivity is low, emotional energy is drained rather than heightened.
Successful interaction rituals have a longer lasting effect on solidarity (Collins 2004, p.149) . However, at some point during or after a (series of) collective action(s), the participants or their resources will be exhausted. Then their interactions weaken and their solidarity decreases. If commitments are correlated with solidarity (Hu et al. 2014) or with degree (Gómez-Gardeñes et al. 2011), there is hysteresis: the backward transition from synchrony to asynchrony occurs at a lower solidarity (or weaker ties) than the forward transition. The initial differences among commitments are then recovered. After a successful collective action, future actions by the same group will be easier to organize.
Discussion
Cooperation under adverse conditions has a cold-start problem for people who have not yet formed a group, and can pose a threshold for existing groups. Both cold starts and thresholds can be overcome by interaction rituals. 14 In contrast with Collins, who took a mutual focus of attention and a shared mood as a starting point for interaction rituals in general, the model captured cognitions and emotions as psychological states and explained their homogeneity as an outcome from initial heterogeneity-a substantial gain in parsimony and insight. The model, and algebraic connectivity in particular, increased precision beyond anything feasible with unaided reason, and the sudden phase transition showed the non-linear character of challenging collective actions.
When the uncertainties and expected costs are low, however, an interaction ritual is not necessary. In these cases it is often sufficient if people converse with one another regarding the public good (Sally 1995; Chaudhuri 2011; Baldassarri 2015) , which establishes social ties and exchanges commitments (Ostrom 1998) , thoughts and emotions. Face to face contact is therefore essential (Sally 1995; De Rooij et al. 2009 ), whereas high solidarity is not, and synchronization can be loosened to a level of consensus that is acceptable to the participants. However, algebraic connectivity helps to achieve rapid consensus. In a graph coloring experiment (Judd et al. 2010) , algebraic connectivity was inversely proportional to the time to reach consensus. There, the subjects had to choose the same color as their network-neighbors, in highly clustered networks and in networks with randomly rewired edgeswhich implies higher algebraic connectivity than in the clustered networks (Olfati-Saber 2005) . An easily obtained consensus is not always beneficial, though, and it can also be a symptom of groupthink (Lorenz et al. 2011) .
For the diffusion of reputations under realistic conditions, social networks should be robust against noise-misinterpreted, wrongly transmitted or manipulated information-and node removal (Moody and White 2003; Ellens and Kooij 2013) . These requirements motivated a definition of social cohesion as the minimum number, κ, of independent paths connecting arbitrary pairs of nodes in a network (White and Harary 2001) . This number is equivalent to the minimum number of nodes that must be removed to make the network fall apart (Harary 1969) . Only in very small networks, for example 7 members of a team, everyone can be connected directly to everyone else (in this example, κ = 6 and λ 2 = 7). It was proven for all incomplete networks (missing at least one tie) that λ 2 ≤ κ (De Abreu 2007). Algebraic connectivity thus indicates not only a synchronization potential in a broad sense, including consensus and robustness against small perturbations of psychological states (McGraw and Menzinger 2007) , but also a lower bound for social cohesion and redundancy of information channels. Low algebraic connectivity, in contrast, facilitates anti-coordination, e.g. choosing a different color for oneself than one's neighbors in a graph coloring game (Judd et al. 2010 ). This anti-coordination is useful when group members want to differentiate themselves to perform complementary tasks. 15 To study dynamic networks, the Kuramoto model has been adapted as follows Gutiérrez et al. 2011) . In a simulation, ties a ij (t) ≥ 0 strengthen among people who perceive one another as similar concerning their psychological states, i.e. an assortment of kindred spirits, which occurs under the constraint of homeostasis. A tie that disappears is modeled as a fading tie, a ij (t) → 0. Starting the simulation with a random network, of strangers who meet for the first time, and letting their solidarity increase from zero to a low value, subgroups emerge that are internally synchronous but mutually asynchronous. If solidarity continues to increase to K ≥ K c , those subgroups merge into one synchronized group. When considering that solidarity varies across individuals, which is represented by a Gaussian distribution of K i , it takes longer for synchronous subgroups to emerge. Individuals with very low K i , for example people who take a passive stance in the ritual (Knottnerus 2010) , stay out of sync with everyone else (Bruggeman and Péli 2014) . As long as these individuals are a minority, the overall pattern is qualitatively the same as with one K for all.
Synchronization interpreted more broadly is widespread in nature (Strogatz and Stewart 1993; Nadis 2003) and in social phenomena, of which we reviewed several. Other cases are energy demand that causes consumption spikes once consumers synchronize, which happens unintentionally despite policy against it (Krause et al. 2015) , and traders at the stock market who reduce their risk of loosing money when they synchronize their transactions (Saavedra et al. 2011) . The most widely known examples are conventions and norms, which also feature an opposition between easy local coordination versus difficult to overcome global anti-coordination (Centola and Baronchelli 2015) , just like synchronization in homophilous subgroups versus overall synchronization. Apart from energy consumers, actors across these situations have in common that they reduce uncertainty, at least locally.
The main results of this study are that in general, the onset of cooperation is predicted to require less effort and occur more rapidly if participants' network has a higher algebraic connectivity. Alternatively, if subgroups with high connectivity or similar members synchronize first, they can form a critical mass that wins over the rest. Under multi-fold uncertainty, a shared intentionality is necessary, which can be achieved by interaction rituals that result in a burst of cooperation.
